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LOGISTIC REQUIREMENTS FOR FORCES
IN SOUTH VIETNAM

1. In late 1965 VC/PAVN forces in South Vietnam were estimated at 110 battalions, including 27 PAVN battalions. There were also about 13,000 VC in separate companies and platoons in the local forces, about 18,000 combat support troops, 100,000 to 120,000 VC guerrilla forces, and approximately 40,000 political/military cadres. Only the 110 combat battalion equivalents (500 men per battalion) in the main force required logistic support from sources outside South Vietnam, so they are the only forces considered in this memorandum.

2. Logistic supply requirements are made up of the following classes of supply: Class I (Food), Class II (Quartermaster), Class III (POL), Class IV (Weapons), and Class V (Ammunition). Total logistic supply requirements for the 110 battalion main force both from sources within and without South Vietnam are broken down as follows:

Class of Supply	Tons Per Day		
	VC	PAVN	Total
Class I	20.8	6.8	27.6
Class II and IV	0.8	3.4	4.2
Class III	Negl.	Negl.	Negl.
Class V	6.0	1.9	7.9
Total	27.6	12.1	39.7

On a pounds per man per day basis these requirements break down as follows:

Class of Supply	Pounds Per Man Per Day	
	VC	PAVN
Class I	1.0	1.0
Class II and IV	0.04	0.5
Class III	Negl.	Negl.
Class V	0.29	0.29
Total	1.33	1.79

The above figures are based on the assumptions that each of the 110 combat battalions is engaged in combat at the levels of most of 1965 (about once in every 35 days) and expends one-third of its basic load of ammunition

during each day of combat. Although the main force battalions have only a negligible requirement for outside logistic support for Classes I and III, they do have a continuing requirement for external support for some types of Class II, Class IV, and Class V supplies. This total daily external logistic requirement for the entire force is about 12 tons per day.

3. If the level of combat in Vietnam is increased to the point where each of the 110 battalions is engaged in combat once in 7 days, the requirement for external logistic support would be over 70 tons per day. The total requirement, including Class I (Food) from internal sources, would be nearly 100 tons per day. If VC/PAVN forces were built up to 155 battalions by the end of 1966 there would be a substantial increase in their dependence on external sources for logistical support and probably in the scale of combat. If these 155 battalions engaged in combat once in every 3 days their external logistic requirements would be at least 165 tons daily. Adding a requirement of approximately 39 tons per day of Class I (Food) from internal sources makes a total daily requirement of over 200 tons per day.

4. The planning factor for the daily resupply of US Army forces in South Vietnam is 49 pounds per man per day, including ammunition for aircraft (Class VA). This requirement is over 27 times the total daily supply requirement for the PAVN soldier, and over 36 times the total daily supply requirement for the VC soldier. The large US requirement as compared with the PAVN/VC requirement is understandable because our forces are better fed, better clothed, better equipped, and are encouraged to use all materiel necessary to achieve objectives.